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URBAN HOMESTEADING: ONCE MORE DOWN THE 
YELLOW BRICK ROAD 
By M. Jan Akre* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Confronted with ominous statistics on crime, social welfare costs, 1 
and health hazards attributable to urban concentrations of pollu-
tion, 2 Americans have questioned the vitality of the urban environ-
ment.3 Recognizing the need for a response to these problems and 
for a program to retain cities as a national wellspring of cultural and 
social stability,4 Congress has enacted several massive federal pro-
grams to curtail housing decay through code enforcement, housing 
subsidies and financing, demolition and slum clearance. These ap-
proaches have had mixed success, but continue as the major na-
tional effort toward reclaiming metropolitan areas by arresting and 
reversing the process of urban decay. 
Although these federal programs have often overpowered state 
and municipal urban planning efforts, their lack of convincing suc-
cess has forced local governments to devise their own methods of 
treating the urban housing problem. One such municipal program, 
homesteading, has been hailed as a potentially formidable tool in 
the eradication of urban blight.5 Essentially, under this program a 
municipality may grant to qualified applicants a conditional deed 
to abandoned urban property over which the municipality has ac-
quired title. In return these applicant homesteaders agree to reha-
bilitate and reside in the housing parcel for a specified time period. 
Upon completion of this requirement, the city deeds the property 
absolutely to the homesteader. As a supplement to existing federal 
programs, this simple idea of giving away abandoned inner-city 
housing to willing rehabilitators may be a noteworthy step in fur-
thering the national objectives of maintaining healthy cities. Ac-
cordingly, this article presents the accomplishments and failures of 
federal efforts at urban renewal and examines in that context the 
homesteading program as an effective solution to the national envi-
ronmental problem of deteriorating urban housing. 
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A three part presentation is used including: (1) a modular analy-
sis of the urban problem; (2) an overview of related federallegisla-
tion; and (3) a study of homesteading ordinances themselves. The 
models presented in this article explain the process of urban dynam-
ics and provide a basic tool for understanding the development of 
cities. Next, the article considers the effectiveness of federallegisla-
tion in attaining national urban rehabilitation goals. Federal legis-
lation provides a necessary reference base for municipal homestead-
ing ordinances because of the facility of legislative comparison and 
the present financial dependence of municipal programs on federal 
enactments. Finally, the mechanics of homesteading ordinances as 
passed by the city councils of Boston, Philadelphia and Wilmington 
are presented and analyzed.8 In considering these homesteading 
proposals, the reader is cautioned that their implementation is at 
present erratic due to the political structure of city government,7 
ease of amendment,8 and conflict with state legislation.9 
II. MODELS OF URBAN DYNAMICS 
Economically, housing rehabilitation through homesteading pres-
ents a long-term solution to urban environmental problems only if 
it utilizes resources more efficiently than alternative proposals. This 
determination of efficiency depends on the effectiveness of urban 
resource allocation in terms of municipal budgeting and environ-
mental costs. The use of urban models is particularly helpful in this 
respect. Although models of urban dynamics normally measure the 
traditional, budgetary costs of urban activity, the environmental 
cost of housing deterioration can be included by studying trends in 
the quality of housing. The assumption must be made that an eco-
nomically healthy city will provide resource support, normally 
through a stable tax base, for expanded urban environmental reha-
bilitation. In order to project the long-term effect of any urban 
activity, for example homesteading legislation, on the city's stock 
of housing, the policy maker may use modular analysis to compre-
hend the interaction of urban pressures over a specific time period. 
Thus, the use of models of urban development may yield both an 
understanding of the economic and historical perspective in which 
homesteading programs must be viewed and a set of practical tools 
for measuring and projecting traditional and environmental costs of 
homesteading in light of present funding programs. 
Although the complexity of urban development has spawned sev-
eral noteworthy models, the nature of urban rehabilitation pro-
grams can be adequately explained through the two simple models 
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presented herein. The "trickle-down" model most accurately repre-
sents the historical reality of urban development and subsequent 
decay.1O The "self-contained ring" model enables the projection of 
a possible future of the city with the homesteading modification as 
a central element. 
A. Trickle-down Model 
Analysts of the urban environment have generally adopted the 
stage process or trickle-down model of urban development to ex-
plain housing life in successive stages of building existence, long-
range stagnation, decay, and, finally, abandonment.u During the 
growth of the major Eastern cities, early capitalists built large, 
single-family dwellings for themselves, and durable multi-family 
tenements for industrial laborers newly arrived to the central city. 
As the city expanded outward, concentric rings of housing (suburbs) 
grew out from the city center. Naturally, the builders and occupants 
of this new and better housing were those with the wealth to relo-
cate. Their former housing, single-family or tenement, had aged 
slightly in this expansion process, but was readily marketable, so it 
trickled down to the next lower economic class. 12 As the city contin-
ued to expand, greater quantities of aged housing eventually glutted 
the marketplace, depressing the price to levels attractive to even the 
lowest economic class. However, time and the succession of owners 
had severely reduced the quality of this early central city housing,l3 
Throughout the early stages of urban development, the snowball 
effect of housing turnover had been partially mitigated by thinning 
forces concomitant with the city's growth: demolition for transpor-
tation systems or for public and private high rise developments; fire; 
or other natural disaster. However, these thinning forces have 
proved unable to keep pace with the inexorable trickle-down pro-
cess. Removal of housing waste has lagged during the long term 
development of the city because of the natural geometric progres-
sion of housing deterioration, the moratoriums on above ground 
urban transit, the disinvestment in private high rise and commer-
cial developments, and the general inefficiency of municipal hous-
ing codes. Existing federal funding programs have heretofore fo-
cused on slowing the trickle-down process by financing code enforce-
ment and homeowner acquisition and repair programs. They have 
also concentrated on removing urban housing waste by demolition 
of unsound structures. However, neither these programs nor normal 
thinning forces have kept pace with the need of cities to replace 
deteriorated housing with structures capable of meeting existing 
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demands for quality housing units. 
Because the trickle-down model projects that the decay of urban 
housing is inevitable and continuous, we can deduce that these 
federal approaches, although apparently ineffective, have been pro-
perly directed, at least insofar as they supplement natural thinning 
forces by removing some poor quality housing. Thus, advocates of 
any specific program attempting to cure urban blight must realize 
the breadth of the problem, but must also focus on the advances 
already made by the existing supportive federal programs. 
The trickle-down theory not only explains the historical causes of 
the prevalence of aged urban housing, but also provides a basis for 
projecting some expected results of homesteading programs in terms 
of cost analysis. Most cities today house a disproportionate share of 
the aged, sick and poor and must allocate an inordinate percentage 
of their b~dgets to normally ancillary city welfare services, e.g., fire, 
ambulance, and police protection. Yet cities may also profit from 
economies of scale by consolidating resources to provide better fun-
damental services, for example in health and medicine. 14 The prob-
lem for urban planners is to maintain the relatively high efficiency 
of resource allocation in fundamental city services, and to improve 
the stock of city housing, or at least slow its deterioration. Thus, the 
percentage of municipal funds invariably allocated to housing areas 
at the low end of the trickle to deal with crime, fire and health 
expenses could be reduced. Current federal programs, which will be 
examined below, proceed on this cost reduction premise. For exam-
ple, code enforcement programs attempt to attain higher levels of 
housing quality, thereby stretching the useful life of existing hous-
ing, and postponing the inevitable increase in welfare and replace-
ment costs. Similarly, municipal governments realize that any 
urban activity which can slow the trickle-down process cuts munici-
pal costs by maintaining a better stock of housing. Thus, a home-
stead program promises a cost reduction not only for municipal 
services, but also for demolition and replacement expenses to the 
extent these are borne by local government. 
Further, municipal costs analysts advocating homesteading ex-
pect both a long-term cost reduction and a positive budgetary gain 
when homesteaders themselves infuse capital and labor back into 
the inner city, a process which will broaden the tax and human 
resource base. 
The environmental costs of urban housing deterioration have 
been catalogued extensively in social and environmental publica-
tions and substantially reduce the quality of life for the city dweller. 
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Generally, the loss of taxes and human resources under existing 
conditions vitiates any concerted urban action premised on a strong 
financial commitment to reduce urban physical pollution. Socially, 
erosion of the stable urban housing tax base produces a downward 
spiraling effect on the urban quality of life by limiting funds for 
protective services, positive social welfare and recreation programs. 
More importantly, urban blight generates a pathological environ-
ment causing unemployment, racial tension, crime, fire, and the 
waste of human resources}5 Finally, these environmental costs en-
courage the middle class flight to the subutbs. This speeds the turn-
over of residential property, hastens abandonment and loads addi-
tional costs on those too old, sick or poor to flee. 
B. Self-contained Ring Model 
As an alternative theory of urban growth, this model expands on 
the historical process whereby urban housing has collected around 
an industrial activity and projects self-contained rings of mini-
urban developments broadly spaced around future vital economic 
functions, the urban rings being connected by sophisticated trans-
portation systems. This projection of cities has been criticized as 
unsupported by data18 and aesthetically unpleasant,17 but the model 
is noteworthy because an effective homesteading program may 
prove to be a transitional element in the development of this now 
conceptual city, if combined with an effective land-use planning 
policy. Essentially, the three-step process of conversion from the 
existing expanding rings to self-contained rings involves: (1) identi-
fication and segregation of various industrial and economic func-
tions into tightly zoned areas of a region, probably with some over-
lap of existing cities; (2) residential and commercial zoning on a 
population density basis in a ring around the economic function 
(which conforms to the historical process of urban development); 
and (3) low density and open space zoning between population cen-
ters. 
The presence of large capital investments in commercial build-
ings in every major American city assures their position as a vital 
economic center. However, there has been a shift in the urban eco-
nomic structure to increasingly high income, white collar and pro-
fessional activities. Meanwhile, this shift has been counterbalanced 
by the relocation of major industry to the suburbs where land has 
been more plentiful. Focusing on this phenomenon, the task of 
urban planners, primarily on a regional level, would be to develop 
new population centers in outlying areas while disposing of outdated 
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housing in the old industrial central city. Homesteading seems par-
ticularly well suited to solving, at least partially, the inner city 
housing problem, especially where coupled with an open-space or 
low density housing policy. Planners could rely upon a marketplace 
force, i.e., the free selection of homesteaders, to 'identify those struc-
tures worth salvaging in a particular neighborhood. Once the selec-
tion process was completed and homesteading allocations made, the 
unsalvageable property could be razed and replaced by either park 
space or new housing within the predefined population density lim-
its. 
On a broad environmental level, open space planning and the re-
duction of population density would have obvious physical benefits. 
Moreover, just as environmental benefits flow from the creation of 
pockets of economic resurgence within the city, the attraction of 
homesteaders into low density urban areas would revive the broad 
class neighborhood concept. Thus, when co-ordinated with a broad 
regional urban plan and extensive razing of un salvageable property, 
the homestead-urban ring model presents an attractive solution to 
urban decay, while maintaining a market for rehabilitated resource 
property. 
III. HISTORICAL ApPROACHES 
Homesteading advocates conscious of the modular dynamics of 
inner city development must also be aware of the merits of previous 
attempts to improve the quality of urban housing stock in order to 
defend legitimate funding efforts from the current disfavor with 
which "housing programs" generally are viewed. IS Although an ex-
haustive presentation of all applicable urban rehabilitation efforts 
is beyond the scope of this article, selected legislative and com-
munity efforts illustrate the hazards of any urban renewal activity. 
A. Demolition 
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 added Section 
116 to the Housing Act of 1949 as an urban renewal program provid-
ing for the demolition and clearance of structures found to be un-
sound according to local building regulations. Ie Under the program, 
the federal government grants up to two-thirds of the cost of demo-
lishing structures which the local governing body has determined to 
be dangerous to life and health under state and local law. 20 To 
become eligible for these federal funds, local governments must cer-
tify the exhaustion of other available legal procedures to secure 
remedial action by the owners of the structures involved. This re-
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quirement insures that cities faced with a severe housing shortage 
caused by an excess of demand over housing supply do not remove 
possibly salvageable housing units from the market too quickly, 
thereby aggravating the shortage and raising prices. In short, this 
requirement reflects a policy decision that even marginal housing 
units in clear violation of local health and safety codes should re-
main in use to forego a displacement of low-end housing occupants 
into better quality and, hence, more expensive housing. Interest-
ingly, in the short term this may save welfare costs by reducing total 
family budget outlays, but in the long term the better solution is to 
encourage the building of better housing. This would effect an in-
crease in the overall supply of housing to meet demand, correct the 
chronic housing shortage faced by many cities, and drive down occu-
pancy costs. 
Considering the fact that that even a condemned building will be 
occupied if shortages and prices so dictate, a demolition program 
may have the negative effect of removing existing structures with 
some utility, but at some point local governments must balance the 
impact of a housing shortage against health and safety hazards and 
decree the demolition of certain buildings . .This process of demoli-
tion has been the traditional governmental approach to the eradica-
tion of slum housing.21 Further, the program performs the function 
of maintaining urban vitality by removing housing waste. This con-
forms to a modular analysis of the eventual breakdown of all hous-
ing activity to the stage of non-utility. 
Despite the appeal of this direct approach, administrative entan-
glements and a mixed reaction of the local citizenry have severely 
retarded the program. Initial attempts by neighborhood citizens to 
designate particular buildings as demolition candidates may be 
frustrated by the requirement of the exhaustion of all legal proce-
dures to induce rehabilitative measures before demolition of the 
building. Thus, a recalcitrant owner unwilling to lose his building 
entirely can initiate short-term rehabilitative measures in marginal 
buildings or employ the time-consuming administrative appeal sys-
tem to protest the condemnation of his building. Meanwhile, struc-
turally unsound buildings may increase and eventually create an 
environmentally blighted area. This promotes more abandonments 
since neither homeowners, landlords nor tenants are willing to com-
mit resources to a neighborhood of decaying, boarded-up buildings. 
While the administrative appeal system preserves the due process 
rights of property owners and is, therefore, consistent with tradi-
tional concepts of property, bureaucratic procedures may be abused 
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so as to delay a necessary condemnation. Shortening the time limit 
for a good faith compliance with building code provisions coupled 
with a more efficient appeal system would probably remove such 
abuses while maintaining the sound reasons for a requirement of 
exhaustion of other legal remedies. 
Another abuse of the local administrative process frequently ar-
ises from the valuation of condemned buildings on the basis of the 
fair market value of surrounding structures in sound condition. This 
practice inflates the cost of acquisition by the municipality and 
offers an incentive for timely abandonment by low-end property 
speculators.22 To cure this defect and discourage the improper use 
of the appeals process by owners of marginal property, fines for 
violation of building codes should progress stiffly, or, alternatively, 
structure valuation should diminish rapidly, as the low-end prop-
erty approaches the stage of condemnation. This would encourage 
an earlier release of decaying structures and remove low-end specu-
lation as a disruptive effect in the model and in the marketplace, 
but would preserve maximum building utility. Before the building 
seriously violated code standards, occupancy would continue and 
utility would be maintained. As the building approached condem-
nation, losing utility, the fine or property valuation system would 
be structured so that the penalty for retention would increase. How-
ever, the crossover point of utility-release would be adjustable by 
variances in the penalty-release incentive system as housing supply, 
demand, or even administrative abuses dictated. For example, a 
code violation penalty of $10/month on housing units of $1000 initial 
valuation could be increased if better housing units were built in the 
city. This would remove low-end marginal housing while maintain-
ing the desired supply-demand relationship. Conversely, a reduc-
tion in the penalty would cause a later release of property, thereby 
stretching low-end utility. 
Viewed more broadly, urban renewal programs which designate 
entire neighborhoods for slum clearance speed the process of disinte-
gration in salvageable buildings by an "announcement effect" on 
property maintenance throughout the area. 23 This effect occurs 
whenever a neighborhood is designated as an urban renewal area. 
Property owners allow the deterioration of their structures without 
even minimal repairs because they realize that the city, by adopting 
an urban renewal plan, has made a commitment to purchase their 
property at fair market value with little regard for the amenities of 
a particular property's maintenance.24 This "announcement effect" 
of urban renewal can be countered by an improved system of prop-
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erty valuation, as noted above, in concert with a comprehensive 
urban and regional plan. This plan, based on the recognition of the 
dynamic flow of housing development through predictable patterns 
or stages, would involve a homesteading-like process which would 
come into play when housing reachlld the final stage, that of non-
utility. At that point, the property must be either demolished or 
rehabilitated. Ideally, the regional plan would map and project the 
flow of individual neighborhoods or particular housing units. Such 
a comprehensive plan has been researched in New Haven for inner 
city housing and supports the surprising regularity of trickle-down 
stage development. 25 By adoption of a broad plan of long-range 
urban renewal based upon this predictable stage process, neighbor-
hoods which desire to retain their ethnic, cultural or political char-
acter within existing housing structures would be afforded the alter-
native of a homesteading program under the urban renewal plan. 
Thus, instead of simply demolishing entire neighborhoods after a 
rapid "announcement effect" deterioration, the urban renewal pro-
gram would encourage renovation, through the homesteading pro-
cess, of preselected units which would provide a stable base for the 
rejuvenation of the "renewed" area. 
In addition to the "announcement effect" of urban renewal, the 
program has suffered from a mixed reception by the citizenry. Spe-
cifically, local citizens and politi cans recognize that federal pro-
grams to demolish city blocks and clear "slums" also eradicate old 
neighborhoods, shuffle constituencies and break down newly 
acquired political power in traditionally disenfranchised minorities. 
Accordingly, large scale urban renewal programs which involve 
demolition of neighborhood tenements and extensive family reloca-
tions are not always favorably received by local citizens. Statutory 
safeguards providing for administrative hearings on the advisability 
of implementing these urban renewal plans are frequently employed 
to register neighborhood opposition, but opponents have also used 
the judicial and political approaches. 
By statute,26 a public hearing must be held before land can be 
acquired by an exercise of eminent domain powers. This type of 
acquisition is ordinarily used where the city intends to demolish 
large areas pursuant to its urban renewal plan. Although the pur-
pose of the hearing is to discover reasons for and against the imple-
mentation of the renewal plan, the Secretary of HUD, the depart-
ment responsible for conducting the hearing, is afforded broad dis-
cretionary powers to weigh the testimony provided. Further, assum-
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ing that the procedural requirements of the hearing are met, the 
decision to go ahead with the urban renewal plan is difficult to 
challenge successfully in court. In reviewing such administrative 
decisions, the judiciary gives considerable weight to the Secretary's 
evaluation of the complexities of fact and policy which entered into 
the decision. Thus, in an urban renewal challenge, the plaintiff is 
effectively limited to showing that the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain is not for a public purpose or that the exercise is de-
signed solely to deny constitutional rights. 
In Berman u. Parker, 'J:/ the Supreme Court of the United States 
sanctioned this broad sweep of eminent domain powers pursuant to 
an urban renewal plan. In that case, plaintiff owned a department 
store which was not itself slum property, but was located in an 
urban renewal area. In upholding the Redevelopment Authority's 
right to take the property, the court struck down both the public 
purpose and constitutional arguments saying: 
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is 
not desirable . . . Congress and its authorized agencies have made de-
terminations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not 
for us to reappraise them.28 
In reality, the political system offers a potentially effective alter-
native for citizens who desire to register their opposition to an urban 
renewal plan affecting their neighborhood. Even though an urban 
renewal plan involves federal funding, the plan is developed and 
administered according to local standards. Thus, the power of the 
electorate at the ballot box can be realistically expected to force 
urban renewal officials to consider fully the needs of local neighbor-
hoods. 
A favorable acceptance of urban renewal programs is vital to the 
success of homesteading. Essentially, homesteading is an urban re-
habilitative approach aimed at the types of neighborhoods wherein 
urban renewal programs have been historically implemented. Con-
sistent with the goals of the overall renewal plan, homesteading 
attempts to combat abandonment by preserving the stability of 
local neighborhoods. However, viable rehabilitated neighborhoods 
can be developed and preserved only where unsalvageable end-stage 
housing is effectively demolished and removed, a process which re-
quires smooth running administrative machinery and a favorable 
local reception. 
To improve the total existing system, some commentators have 
advocated the adoption of a comprehensive housing maintenance 
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code and the consolidation of the various municipal departments 
which evaluate urban housing. 29 This would coordinate intracity 
and intergovernmental standards of housing and demolition. Fur-
ther, eminent domain, tax foreclosure and property valuation must 
be revamped to speed the mechaniCs of marginal building removal 
and to remove the incentive in maintaining property without re-
pair.3u In sum, under either model of urban dynamics, a comprehen-
sive, efficient urban renewal plan can be formulated to integrate 
demolition and homesteading in scheduling specific neighborhoods 
for redevelopment. As an alternative, retention of the present sys-
tem hampers urban rehabilitative homesteading by incurring ad-
verse local reaction, which aggravates the build-up of abandoned 
housing and eventually forces the indiscriminate demolition of en-
tire city blocks. 
B. Code Enforcement 
Since their introduction as health and safety measures in New 
York at the turn of the century, building codes have been a margin-
ally effective approach to neighborhood housing quality control. In 
1965, this approach gained additional impetus when Congress 
added Section 117 to the Housing Act of 1949.31 Under Section 117, 
municipalities may obtain federal grants covering up to three-
fourths of the cost of planning and administering concentrated code 
enforcement programs in deteriorating but basically sound local 
areas.32 Designed to assist local communities to restore stability to 
neighborhoods, the program funds neighborhood public improve-
ments such as streets, sidewalks, curbs, street lighting and tree 
planting, plus the administration of building code compliance.· 
While funding of these public improvements is beneficial to overall 
urban rehabilitation, curing the present inefficiency of building 
code enforcement itself would have a more immediate and benefi-
cial impact on the quality of the urban environment. 
Administratively, the development of housing codes as health and 
safety measures resulted in diffusion of their enforcement power to 
compartmentalized, understaffed municipal agencies.33 These agen-
cies inspect and record code violations within their own particular 
area of development on the sound theory that specialization of de-
partments fosters expertise. For example, the fire department may 
inspect for fire hazards, the building inspector for structural haz-
ards, and the health department for health and sanitary dangers. 
Until recently, most cities had no comprehensive municipal housing 
code, but even with the adoption of a comprehensive code, munici-
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palities chose to retain enforcement diffused through various munic-
ipal departments. This has caused confusion, administrative delay 
and uneven code enforcement. Consolidation of the various code 
inspections, evaluations and enforcement under a single municipal 
agency would correct these problems. Additionally, such a munici-
pal housing agency should be empowered to draft code provisions 
concomitant with the peculiar development pattern of the city and 
to provide equitable and stringent enforcement. Consolidation of 
code enforcement under one agency would also remove the labyrinth 
of administrative appeals which currently allows violators of several 
code areas to engage in marginal compliance. 
Although the present system of uneven code enforcement may 
breed landlord resentment because of the complexities involved and 
may result in possible economic advantage to violators,34 homes-
teaders should realize that there are natural limitations to any code 
system. Essentially, a code system provides only for inspection for 
health and safety standards rather than for maintenance and reha-
bilitation. Thus, the program is limited to slowing rather than re-
versing the stages of housing decay and cannot by itself curtail 
blight, clear slums or solve the abandonment problem. However, 
even with this limitation, strict code enforcement in conjunction 
with rehabilitation programs can maintain better quality housing in 
salvageable neighborhoods. Thus, where a neighborhood has been 
designated for urban renewal or rehabilitation, the general quality 
of salvageable property will be increased if proper inspection is car-
ried out and the material provisions of the code are effectively en-
forced. 
C. Public Financing 
Existing federal legislation designed to finance private urban re-
habilitation uses four approaches: direct rehabilitation grants and 
10ans;35 mortgages for low income developments including rehabili-
tation;36 mortgage guarantees to home owners and builders;37 and 
tax incentives.38 Current Congressional efforts39 seek to expand these 
financial approaches, and to encourage the rehabilitation of existing 
housing stock by individual families. Clearly, infusion of capital 
into the inner cities under these federal proposals significantly af-
fects existing rehabilitation projects including homesteading. 
Therefore, the efficiency of these financing programs and the degree 
to which they are retained and supported by subsequent enactments 
are significant. 
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1. Direct Rehabilitative Grants and Loans. To abate the deteriora-
tion of houses in an urban renewal or concentrated code enforce-
ment area, Congress enacted Section 115 of the Housing Act of 1965 
which establishes a program whereby the federal government grants 
up to $3,500 to families whose annual income does not exceed 
$3,000.40 These grants must be used for repairs and improvements 
necessary to correct incipient code violations or to maintain the 
existing structure in compliance with code standards. Although this 
program directs funds to a critical stage of urban housing deteriora-
tion, the program's effectiveness has been tightly constrained by its 
application to a narrow income and rehabilitation class. However, 
where the cost of rehabilitation exceeds $3,500, or the family's in-
come is in excess of $3,000 the owner/occupant is eligible under 
Section 312 of the Housing Act of 1964 for a rehabilitation loan up 
to $12,000 at 3% for a period of 20 years or three-fourths of the 
economic life of the property, whichever is less. 41 
By August 31, 1970, there were more than $97,000,000 in mort-
gages outstanding covering over 25,000 dwelling units which had 
been financed under the 312 program.42 This suggests that broad 
financial approaches to support homesteading, even in deteriorating 
neighborhoods, will succeed if they are consistent with the general 
purposes of urban rehabilitative programs: halting deterioration by 
reducing the intensity of land use; removing non-complying struc-
tures; and encouraging investment in homeownership.43 This con-
sistency of purposes which apparently accounts for the unique suc-
cess of these programs, is evident from the process of implementa-
tion of the program. Allocation of funds under the program requires 
an initial determination by the agency responsible for implementa-
tion44 that the building is structurally sound and salvageable by an 
infusion of reasonable amounts of labor and capital. This thins out 
deteriorating structures and reduces land use intensity in marginal 
neighborhoods since rejected buildings will remain subject to code 
violations and eventually will be demolished. By measuring repairs 
and improvements aginst existing code standards, noncomplying 
structures are eliminated either by conversion through program 
improvements or by demolition. Finally, the program contains criti-
cal provisions which enable the homeowner to refinance total in-
debtedness at a lower interest rate. In essence, the homeowner may, 
under limited conditions, consolidate the low interest rehabilitative 
loan with his outstanding mortgages on the structure so that his 
total monthly payment does not exceed 20% of his average monthly 
income. 45 This avoids the burden that a separate rehabilitative loan 
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would normally add to monthly cash flows for housing payments 
and thus provides a boost to low income families anxious to main-
tain a secure investment in homeownership. Significantly, approxi-
mately one-third of the total funding under the 312 program has 
involved such refinancing. 
While conceding the merits of direct cash subsidies, Congress is 
currently debating the form which future housing programs will 
take. Essentially, the Nixon Administration has advocated a 
revenue-sharing approach to community development which would 
turn over federal funds to communities with no strings attached, 
and would replace all subsidized federal housing programs with 
limited direct cash payments to the poor.46 This would be a consis-
tent and practical extension of existing programs insofar as it en-
courages individual rehabilitation of existing housing stock to alle-
viate urban blight. However, the Senate recently sent to the House 
a massive housing bill which consolidates and continues most major 
community development programs but also increases funding for 
existing loan programs. 47 
Economists and law professors have joined this debate over the 
more efficient method of funding urban rehabilitation. They have 
narrowed the issue to whether a separate benefit flows from reten-
tion of the urban renewal program. 48 Such a separate benefit would 
be necessary to economically justify the continued existence of the 
program in view of the axiom that a direct subsidy is always cheaper 
than a subsidy in kind. For homesteaders, retention of funding for 
demolition, code enforcement and financing programs is vital, but 
could be more efficiently administered by local agencies. Thus, 
elimination of existing federal programs will be beneficial only if 
local governments are willing to implement these programs, pre-
sumably with revenue-sharing funds. The administration's proposal 
for a direct cash subsidy to the poor will affect the homesteader only 
if he himself is poor. Yet this provision may have a significant bene-
ficial impact on homesteading since a poor family receiving a direct 
subsidy, instead of an apartment in a public housing project, would 
be able to spend the subsidy to rehabilitate a homestead parcel, 
thereby increasing the poor family's equity and commitment to the 
neighborhood. Further, homestead parcels are generally located in 
the impoverished sections of the city. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that the market for homesteading would be greatly expanded 
if the poor residents were given access to the market by a direct cash 
subsidy. In sum, a timely resolution of this debate is crucial for 
urban rehabilitation because these existing programs and Congres-
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sional proposals form an important source of financing for the indi-
vidual homesteader and for beleaguered municipalities inaugurat-
ing homesteading legislation. 
2. Low Income Mortgages and Mortgage Guarantees. The primary 
purpose of the home ownership program for low income families 
established by Section 235 of the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 196849 is to provide a decent home and a suitable living 
environment for those families whose income level has traditionally 
excluded them from real property ownership.50 Accordingly, the 235 
program facilitates the acquisition of new or rehabilitated housing 
by providing a direct subsidy which varies with family income and 
reduces the cost of mortgage interest and insurance. For example, 
a family buying a $20,000 house on a $6,500 annual adjusted gross 
income would make monthly payments of $93 and receive a subsidy 
in the same amount. Families with higher incomes buying the same 
house would receive a diminished subsidy, while those with lower 
incomes would be more heavily subsidized if other expenses remain 
constant. 
Since this program resembles the direct grant and loan programs, 
it should have been equally successful. However, administration of 
the 235 program was delegated to the Federal Housing Administra-
tion, thus merging into the FHA's traditional insurance writing ap-
proach a series of social goals stemming from the commitment of 
high-risk loans and housing subsidies to declining city neighbor-
hoods. In retrospect, this marriage of the FHA and the 235 program 
has not been wise for several reasons. 
In applying the program, the FHA bureaucracy has been largely 
uncommitted to the social objectives of 235 legislation.51 This has 
resulted in a general inadequacy of urban housing appraisals and a 
lack of commitment to the low income borrower himself. 52 Moreover, 
administrative unresponsiveness contributes to the abandonment 
process when purchasers realize that they have been sold an impro-
perly 'inspected, dilapidated house and that there is little money 
available from the family budget to make needed repairs, since 
under the program mortgage payments are geared to a maximum 
in proportion to income. Thus, the buyer is forced to remain in the 
house until it is absolutely uninhabitable or until he is forced out 
by mounting penalties stemming from local code violations. 53 De-
spite isolated scandals under the program, 54 these pressures on the 
individual homeowner went unnoticed initially, but their snowball 
effect was overwhelming: in Detroit, under the 235 program, HUD 
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repossessed 5,200 houses; in Philadelphia there were over 4,000 fore-
closures.55 Embarrassingly, in a number of cities, HUD is now the 
largest owner of single family houses, 58 none of which comply with 
even the most liberal housing codes, although they do provide a 
potential source for homestead property. 
Similarly, mortgage guarantees for moderate income urban home-
owners57 have suffered from the FHA's self-image as a quasi-lending 
institution, unwilling to adjust its administration of loans and guar-
antees to inner city rehabilitators, rather than as a public service 
agency. 58 The Congressional Committee on Banking and Currency 
has criticized the agency for "excessive red tape, extensive delays in 
processing applications, inordinately cumbersome and complicated 
procedural requirements." The Committee strongly urged that the 
Department". . . enable potential beneficiaries to adapt programs 
more specifically to their individual needs."59 Congressional disen-
chantment with the FHA's implementation of urban redevelopment 
programs is expressed in pending legislation to reorganize and con-
solidate the 235 program,80 but Congress has not yet settled the 
central question of which federal agency will administer the pro-
gram if it is retained. 
As demonstrated by the relatively successful implementation of 
urban rehabilitation loans, federal direct subsidies to individual 
rehabilitators could be effective under existing legislation if the 
FHA were restructured. If revitalized as a consumer protection 
agency with expanded prosecution powers consistent with its con-
sumer protection role, the FHA could build into practical adminis-
tration a concern for implementing the essentially social underpin-
nings of rehabilitation legislation. The emphasis should shift to 
guidance and counseling services for the individual borrower in con-
junction with local lending institutions. Additionally, rehabilitation 
property should be screened with state and local urban renewal 
planners to remove the disruptive influence of low-end speculators 
from the marketplace.8! Under revenue-sharing proposals to sup-
plant the FHA entirely,82 the same principles are applicable to 
whatever agency assumes its functions. 
3. Tax Incentives. Justifiably disillusioned with Section 236 of the 
National Housing Act83 as a tax incentive program designed to at-
tract private investors into the construction of low income housing, 
Congress added Section 167(k)84 to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to 
encourage rehabilitation of the existing housing stock. Simply 
stated, 167(k) provides that a taxpayer may elect to compute a 
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depreciation deduction attributable to rehabilitation expenditures 
incurred with respect to low income rental housing under the 
straight line method using a useful life of 60 months and no salvage 
value. 65 For the individual homesteader, there is no value in the 
incentive. Low income rehabilitators lack sufficient income to profit 
from the depreciation allowance. Middle income investors of time, 
labor and capital in the rehabilitation project are excluded from 
claiming the deduction because their property is not low income 
housing as required by the statute. 66 Upper income investors recog-
nize the latent complexities of the provision,67 including rising 
incidence of default68 and the ultimate dependence of economic 
feasibility of the investment on obtaining mortgage insurance and 
interest reduction benefits from HUD.69 
Tax expenditure analysis provides cogent arguments for replacing 
the existing tax incentive program with direct governmental assis-
tance, e.g., by direct grant, loan, interest subsidies, guarantees of 
loan repayment, etc. 70 None of the asserted virtues of a tax incentive 
program are applicable to the urban rehabilitation goals of the pro-
gram. For example, tax incentives no longer encourage the private 
sector to engage in the social program of building housing for the 
poor because the rising rate of default has caused the private sector 
to lose money under the incentive. Another professed virtue is that 
tax incentives are simple and require less government supervision, 
thereby promoting private decision making. Yet, this can surely be 
accomplished by a simple direct subsidy to rehabilitators as visual-
ized under pending Congressional legislation.71 Further, removal of 
urban renewal funding from the Internal Revenue Service would 
encourage administrative simplicity on a local level and provide 
more accurate measures of the true costs of urban blight. This would 
encourage municipal governments to be more responsive to the re-
habilitative needs of the city and would promote the use of home-
steading as a viable local alternative to urban decay. 
IV. HOMESTEADING LEGISLATION 
Recognizing that urban renewal, code enforcement and rehabili-
tation finance measures depend upon local application for their 
success, the federal government has attempted to return the task of 
providing a decent home for every American72 to state and local 
governments. 73 Concomitant with this evolving federal policy, 
municipalities have become increasingly willing to assume responsi-
bility for the reformation of inner cities and to launch imaginative 
programs relying on increased citizen participation in the rebuilding 
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of cities.74 Philosophically, homesteading proposals draw on the 
spirit that settled the West;75 realistically, in the wake of existing 
legislative difficulties, they must meet rigorous standards for suc-
cessful implementation in halting further deterioration of the city. 
Faced with marginally effective federal programs and no restric-
tive state legislation, on May 18, 1973, Wilmington, Delaware insti-
tuted an Urban Homestead Program designed to counter the seige 
of abandonment and restore the estimated 2,000 abandoned houses 
in that city to the tax rolls.78 Philadelphia soon followed with an 
ordinance of its own authorizing the Mayor to establish a homestead 
program.H Most recently, the Boston City Council passed a home-
steading ordinance, but the Mayor has refused to implement it, 
citing intergovernmental legal obstacles and practical difficulties.78 
This municipal activity provides a basic introduction to the me-
chanics of homesteading and to the foreseeable pitfalls. 
A. Homesteading Resource Property 
The inner city contains an abundance of abandoned, structurally 
sound houses, but municipal access to clear title on abandoned 
property can be hindered by state law impediments, delay in munic-
ipal tax lien foreclosures or by HUD's retention of title. As noted 
above, under existing federal programs, HUD takes title to property 
financed under mortgage guarantees and later abandoned.79 Al-
though federal law provides for the sale of federally held real prop-
erty to communities implementing an urban renewal program,80 
which would apparently include homesteading, cities have not yet 
resorted to this method of acquiring title to specific properties be-
cause conventional tax foreclosures and gifts have provided suffi-
cient property for the current scale of the homesteading programs. 81 
However, the adoption of more effective demolition, code enforce-
ment, and planning measures in coordination with a successful 
homesteading program will probably require consolidation of titles 
to all abandoned buildings within closely defined neighborhoods. 
For example, where local government adopts open space planning 
under the homesteading-self contained ring model,82 implementa-
tion of land use intensity goals and broad gauge environmental 
plans will require the extensive razing of end-stage housing units, 
which may transcend normal municipal boundaries to include dete-
riorated units in some older suburbs. Accordingly, federal, state and 
municipal governments should establish a workable policy as to 
whether HUD will transfer title to the states or municipalities or to 
a regional planning board empowered to allocate salvageable prop-
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erty to municipal homestead boards in conformity with the regional 
development plan. The eventual use of regional planning boards to 
assume the present duties of the municipal homesteading board 
seems the best solution because it maintains a local perspective on 
urban problems but still allows combined municipal areas greater 
access to federal planning and environmental funds. 
To date, state law impediments to homesteading programs have 
been raised only with regard to proposed tax incentive features of 
the ordinances and not to municipal handling of property titles. 
However, it is foreseeable that regional planning for expanded cities 
may necessitate a pre-emption of municipal titles, especially where 
federal legislation requires a state or regional plan as a condition of 
funds for urban renewal projects.83 A state planning board empow-
ered to release title to municipalities in conformity to regional popu-
lation density goals could have the same beneficial effect as the 
regional planning board noted above. 
A final obstruction of municipal access to clear title of potential 
homesteading property lies in the administrative delay of foreclo-
sures on municipal tax liens. Although under state law the munici-
pality might have first priority in taking title to satisfy a tax judg-
ment, bureaucratic inefficiency may inordinately delay the foreclo-
sure process. An overhaul of the administrative machinery under 
guidelines set forth under the demolition and code enforcement sec-
tions above would also have beneficial effects in this area by provid-
ing resource property for this rehabilitative program. 
B. Mechanics of Homesteading: The Board and its Functions 
To establish a coordinating agency for homesteading activity, a 
municipal ordinance should authorize the Mayor of each city to 
appoint a Homestead Board composed of 3-11 members, serving 
without compensation, who would represent every housing agency, 
plus members of the general community: contractors, clergymen, 
bankers, and "two low-income residents of the city."84 To adminis-
ter the Homestead Program, the Board should be broadly empow-
ered to obtain necessary staffing and to "prepare regulations to 
implement the purpose and spirit of urban homesteading and recla-
mation."R5 This would include publicizing the program, screening 
resource property and applicants, executing deeds of conveyance 
(conditional and final), seeking financing for improvements, in-
specting for code compliance, and authorizing tax abatement. 
The Board should also be empowered to utilize the aid and assis-
tance of other relevant city agencies in the furtherance of its duties 
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and responsibilities. Philadelphia has budgeted $500,000 for the use 
of the Board.80 Given the responsibilities of the Board and its power 
to hire staff to implement the actions taken by the Board, it would 
seem that some sort of salaried administrative position should be set 
up to coordinate the various functions of the Board. Efficient func-
tioning of the Board is essential to the success of the homestead 
program, since as has been discussed, administrative inefficiency 
can have a substantial detrimental effect on urban renewal pro-
grams. Therefore, the budget which Philadelphia has allocated for 
the Homestead Board's use is encouraging as an economic commit-
ment to the program's success. However, the commitment must be 
more than economic. Recognizing that the homestead proposals are 
still in the formative stages, they are administratively quite un-
structured. Though the purposes of these programs are generally 
agreed upon, how the Homestead Board will function in the context 
of the machinery of state and municipal governments has been left 
unresolved. For the present, the small scale of these programs has 
prevented the lack of structure from seriously impairing the practi-
cal functions, but there are indications that administrative prob-
lems may soon arise.87 Thus, it is the responsibility of homesteading 
advocates to redraft the present proposals to define more clearly the 
administrative process and relationships in which the Board func-
tions. 
To evaluate resource property the Board would prepare lists of 
city owned residential property suitable for rehabilitation. After a 
municipality acquires clear title to a group of abandoned buildings 
the Department of Licenses and Inspections,88 in conjunction with 
Departments of Planning and Development89 or an ad hoc commit-
tee,90 would inspect the properties to determine suitable structural 
candidates for rehabilitation91 and would mark rejected buildings 
for demolition. The screened and accepted property would be listed 
with the municipal Homestead Board which would then consider 
applications for homestead property from indiviuals. 
Under existing programs individual applicants for homestead 
property must meet age, citizenship, residence and financial quali-
fications. Specifically, the applicant must be at least 18 years of age 
in Boston and Wilmington, although Philadelphia requires that the 
applicant be 21. 92 Interestingly, Wilmington also requires the appli-
cant to be the head of the family.93 Citizenship of the United States, 
or at least a declaration of intention to become such, is required, and 
Boston requires that an applicant be a bona fide resident of that city 
and gives preference to neighborhood residents. 94 The critical evalu-
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ation for many applicants is the requirement of proven financial 
status and/or building trade skills to rehabilitate an existing struc-
ture or construct a new dwelling. D5 This evaluation comports with 
the philosophy behind homesteading itself and is probably a vital 
part in these early stages of program development if homesteading 
is to succeed as a pilot program. Significantly, the same rehabilita-
tive goals can be accomplished in several various methods because 
the individual applicant is allowed to substitute any skilled individ-
ual to fulfill this requirement. For example, if a homesteader secures 
financing and desires to renovate and reside in an inner city home, 
he is allowed to contract for the actual rehabilitation. This should 
provide a beneficial marketplace response by encouraging com-
munity contractors to specialize in rehabilitation, which would pro-
mote employment in the inner city. Because the widespread public-
ity on the program has encouraged an overwhelming number of 
applicants, the actual distribution of homestead parcels has been by 
lottery, D6 but ordinances should provide for the homestead board to 
approve applicants with a view toward compatibility of the parcel 
assigned to him.D7 This compatibility should be determined by: (1) 
the condition of the structure; (2) the personal abilities of the 
applicant; (3) assets of the applicant; (4) mortgage commitments; 
and (5) availability of financing. D8 
On completion of the screening process, the actual conveyance of 
the property from the municipality to the homesteader should be in 
two stages: conditional and final. Initially, the applicant would 
receive a conditional deed for a nominal fee and his promise to 
perform the elements of a contractual obligation with the city.DD 
This contract should require the applicant to rehabilitate or con-
struct on the assigned parcel, permit periodic code inspections of the 
property and bring the parcel up to code standards within 12-18 
months. 
Under the Wilmington plan, breach of the homesteaders contract 
results in a 30 day notice to the homesteader to "surrender and quit 
the assigned parcel in a condition at least equal to that when first 
assigned."loo The city then reclaims the property. This reclamation 
deters low-end speculation by, for example, the use of strawmen to 
take parcels of inner city property, since the city can effectively 
reclaim the property by citing breach of the strawmen's contract. 
However, it appears to be weak statutory drafting because it ignores 
the problem of compensation for equity forfeited under a breach by 
a good faith homesteader. For example, where a homesteader under-
takes a $10,000 rehabilitation job and completes $8,000 leaving 
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$2,000 of the job unfinished within the prescribed time period, the 
building may well be still violative of code standards and subject 
to reclamation by the city. Two possible solutions present them-
selves. The city may enact an amendment to existing ordinances 
which provides for compensation upon such reclamation. The ques-
tion to be answered is whether such compensation should be less 
than or equal to the homesteader's equity. The advantage of a lib-
eral compensation rule is that participation in the program would 
be encouraged. The disadvantage is that the city would be called 
upon to insure the homesteader in case of default to the extent of 
his equity. This could be costly to the program as a whole, since the 
property would presumably still be sub-code and would be returned 
to the homesteading pool to be conditionally sold again for $1. The 
other alternative is to give 30 day notice to the homesteader to quit 
the parcel but to provide for an auction within that 30 days for sale 
of the homestead property. The proceeds, less auction expenses, 
would go to the original homesteader to enable him to recoup his 
investment in the property. This second alternative allows the mar-
ket mechanism to determine the extent of equity that a defaulting 
homesteader may recover. Of course, the unknown factor here is 
what kind of market would exist for partially rehabilitated housing. 
Clearly, this alternative is less of an encouragement to the home-
steader, but the fact that it is assumed that property values in a 
homesteading area will generally be on the rise gives the home-
steader some assurance that an auction-sale will return at least a 
portion of his equity.101 
The homesteader should have to agree to live in, occupy and 
maintain to City Code standards lO2 the parcel for a period of 3 to 5 
years. At the end of this contractual lease period the property would 
be conveyed in fee simple to the homesteader. This method of con-
veyance of title is excellent and guarantees elimination of some prior 
abuses of inner city housing programs. The requirement of actual 
residence in the structure for a period of years before title actually 
vests assures continued maintenance of the property in compliance 
with building codes and eliminates the rapid deterioration of city 
housing. Additionally, the human resource commitment to neigh-
borhoods should have positive beneficial effects in eliminating 
neighborhood blight generally. 
Since most of the buildings held by municipalities require an 
estimated $10,000 per unit to rehabilitate, even with the home-
steader doing much of the work,103 and the process of capital disin-
vestment in inner cities by any type of lending institution is now 
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firmly established,l04 the major obstacle to rehabilitation is funding 
the individual homesteader. Accordingly, Homestead Boards have 
sought to broaden the homesteader's access to financing by inducing 
local banks to provide mortgage money. However, federal sources 
such as the rehabilitation loan, mortgage and mortgage guarantee 
programs still provide the most fertile source of funds. Therefore, it 
is imperative to insure that these funds are available to homestead-
ers even though their title is conditionally held. Municipalities 
should seek an early definite ruling on this point from HUn, but it 
seems that homesteaders would be in compliance with federal re-
quirements for funds since they are acting under the aegis of a 
locally authorized plan for urban rehabilitation. lo5 Adoption of Con-
gressional proposals for a direct subsidy program, especially if chan-
nelled through the existing municipal Homestead Boards, would be 
advantageous to municipalities because funds would be controlled 
and disbursed at the local level. Coupled with effective use of demo-
lition and code enforcement funds, a municipal urban renewal plan 
could then be more successfully implemented, revitalizing home-
stead neighborhoods. This would raise local property values which 
would, in the long run, induce private capital investment by con-
ventional lenders without federal guarantees, thereby providing a 
reduction in federal resource allocation to the inner city. 
Provided that the Homestead Board finds suitable financing and 
a homesteader for its housing parcel, a conditional deed or lease 
would be granted to the individual, and he would begin to restore 
the property. This conditional deed arrangement should provide for 
regular on-site inspection for code compliance by an agency respon-
sible to the Homestead Board, but should also allow specific 
short-term exemptions consistent with the overall rehabilitation of 
the housing parcel. This continuous inspection process would allow 
the Homestead Board to render technical assistance in analyzing 
the work to be done and legal and financial advice on preparing 
specifications, cost estimates and contracts for tasks beyond the 
individual rehabilitator's expertise. The inspection process would 
correct a major defect in prior federal programs: abandonment of 
housing equity by erstwhile rehabilitators. By advising the homes-
teader as to real labor, material and finance costs of the project, the 
Homestead Board and its staff would effectively assume the social 
role recommended above for the FHA, albeit in a much more limited 
application. Here, again, it is imperative that the Homestead Board 
be adequately funded to perform this function. A properly funded 
board will be able to provide a field test of the feasibility of propos-
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als for FHA improvement. It is predictable that a local commitment 
to urban rehabilitation will correct the FHA's tolerance of low-end 
speculation and slipshod finance counselling. Thus, rehabilitators 
will preserve their individual equities in housing, a fact which will 
remove the snowball effect of massive federal mortgage defaults, 
and bolster equity insurance to the city, the lender and guarantor. 
The final element of current homesteading ordinances is a tax 
abatement clause which provides the homestead parcel with a prop-
erty tax exemption for a specified period of at least 5 years. In 
Wilmington, homesteaders will be able to deduct one-half the value 
of any capital improvement to the property from the original' tax 
assessment for a period of five years. I06 In Boston, a complete ex-
emption was proposed.lo7 
Unlike an income tax incentive which depends for its value on the 
income of the taxpayer and, hence, may have little real value to the 
homesteader, an exemption from property tax always has the exact 
value of the tax since these funds are retained by the rehabilitator, 
regardless of his income level. Thus, this feature would always be 
more efficient and favorable to the individual than current federal 
programs such as 167(k). Further, tax abatement strikes a chord of 
fair play when one realizes that the city has depended on the indi-
vidual homesteader himself to supply labor and capital to improve 
property which everyone else in the city had abandoned entirely and 
which was draining municipal resources. Thus, the city should be 
willing to forego reaping the double benefits of this turnaround, 
especially since the homesteader's capital improvements will raise 
the property valuation base and thus raise future taxes levied. Ac-
cordingly, the Boston proposal for a full exemption is better. Fur-
ther, this provision for tax abatement should be expanded to include 
carryover provisions for the five year term of required residence. 
This would encourage homesteaders to make their expenditures ear-
lier in the rehabilitative process rather than stretching them out 
over 2 years or more to take full advantage of the abatement. 
Despite these economic and equitable arguments, the tax abate-
ment program may be thwarted by individual state laws. For exam-
ple, the statutes of the Commonwealth of Massachusettsl08 do not 
allow the City of Boston to grant a tax exemption to private persons, 
although the state laws of Delaware and Pennsylvania contain no 
such restriction. Although this obstacle may be circumvented by the 
establishment of a charitable corporation to hold legal title during 
the tax abatement term, it seems more consistent with the philoso-
phy of the homesteading proposals to amend state law as needed. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As this article indicates, homesteading legislation can be an effec-
tive, viable tool in the eradication of urban blight only if it comports 
with the reality of urban dynamics and rides the crest of federal 
legislation. In relating homesteading to patterns of urban growth, it 
is important to implement homesteading in conjunction with an 
overall urban renewal plan. Such a plan would be best drafted in 
conformity to the self-contained ring model because of the current 
demographic trends which have led to present inner-city population 
decreases. Thus, it is imperative for municipalities to surrender 
some of their political power to either a state or regional planning 
board capable of maintaining a local perspective on the problem vis-
a-vis the federal bureaucracy, but also empowered- to impl~ment 
broad gauge environmental planning. This necessarily cuts across 
traditional city boundaries and will require the surrender of some 
political power by municipalities. In view of cities' experience with 
higher government, especially with regard to urban rehabilitation, 
this suggestion will not be well received. However, it seems to be the 
only realistic alternative if homesteading is to have a long range 
environmental impact. 
The exi!1ting federal programs to rehabilitate urban centers are 
clearly a collective disaster. Billions of dollars have been spent with-
out significantly altering the quality of life. While it is undoubtedly 
true that the condition of cities would have been much worse with-
out these expenditures, it is equally valid that the expenditures 
have been shockingly inefficient. More money probably goes into 
the administration of the programs than into the substance of re-
newal. Clearly, this process could be pared by an allocation offunds 
directly to local government and to the poor through revenue-
sharing and direct cash subsidies. This assumes that local govern-
ment is more efficient with funds because it is more responsible to 
a smaller electorate. This assumption is probably valid now, and 
will be strengthened as the human resource base expands with the 
success of urban rehabilitation. Direct cash subsidies to the poor 
would undoubtedly be beneficial in giving the low income segment 
of our society a real commitment to a healthy society. 
Urban homesteading ordinances are sufficiently drafted as a pilot 
program. However, they must be closely reexamined in light of the 
suggestions made above to insure that foreseeable pitfalls are 
avoided once the program spreads beyond its current low level of 
implementation. In particular, nothing is more vital to their success 
than a central planner/manager on the Board with the authority to 
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operate a staff of proper size and with sufficient expertise. Yet ordi-
nances now provide for the staff to report to an amorphous Board 
rather than a central manager. This structure may in the long run 
prove fatal to a program which depends for its success on the ability 
of the Board to cut across political lines, implement an effective 
demolition program, revamp the present toothless system of fines 
for code enforcement and convince bankers to invest in condemned 
property. However, homesteading has a bright future if politicans 
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